

*Proportional*  
RANKED  
CHOICE  
VOTING  
STUDY




# Proportional Ranked Choice Voting (pRCV) Study

## *Phase 1: Municipal Elections*



**Remember this acronym:**

pRCV – proportional Ranked Choice Voting



See **page 11** in study guide.




# This study asks. . .

Does LWVME support the use of  
**proportional RCV** to achieve  
**proportional representation?**



Remember this acronym:

LWVME – League of Women Voters of Maine



# Scope of the study: pRCV



## Single-seat offices

- Mayor
- Governor
- President



## Multi-member bodies

- Municipal Councils and Boards
- County Commissions
- State Legislature
- Federal Legislature

# Scope of the study: pRCV



## Single-seat offices

- Mayor
- Governor
- President



## Multi-member bodies

- Municipal Councils and Boards
- County Commissions
- State Legislature
- ~~Federal Legislature~~

# Scope of the study: pRCV



## Single-seat offices

- Mayor
- Governor
- President




## Multi-member bodies

- Municipal Councils and Boards
- County Commissions
- State Legislature
- ~~Federal Legislature~~


# This study asks. . .

Does LWVME support the use of  
**proportional RCV** to achieve  
**proportional representation**  
**in municipal elections?**



# Why pRCV?

We have a problem in Maine municipal elections.





# Common methods aren't reliably proportional.

## Town Council

*Vote for 3.*

Candidate 1

Candidate 2

Candidate 3

Candidate 4

Candidate 5

# Common methods aren't reliably proportional.

**Town Council**  
*Vote for 3.*

|             |                       |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Candidate 1 | <input type="radio"/> |
| Candidate 2 | <input type="radio"/> |
| Candidate 3 | <input type="radio"/> |
| Candidate 4 | <input type="radio"/> |
| Candidate 5 | <input type="radio"/> |



All current Councilors  
are registered as  
Republicans. . .

# Common methods aren't reliably proportional.

**Town Council**  
*Vote for 3.*


|             |                       |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| Candidate 1 | <input type="radio"/> |
| Candidate 2 | <input type="radio"/> |
| Candidate 3 | <input type="radio"/> |
| Candidate 4 | <input type="radio"/> |
| Candidate 5 | <input type="radio"/> |



All current Councilors  
are registered as  
Republicans. . .



. . . even though ~40%  
vote Democrat.

**Common methods  
aren't reliably  
proportional.**



# Common methods aren't reliably proportional.


All current  
Councilors are  
registered  
Democrats. . .




# Common methods aren't reliably proportional.

All current  
Councilors are  
registered  
Democrats. . .

. . . even though  
~30% vote  
Republican.



# The Agenda



## Background

- Relevant League positions
- What is proportional representation?

# The Agenda


Part  
1

## Background

Part  
2

## What is pRCV?

- History
- Modern usage
- Mechanics





# The Agenda

Part  
1


Background

Part  
2

What is pRCV?

Part  
3

Common methods v. pRCV



# The Agenda

Part  
1

Background

Part  
2


What is pRCV?

Part  
3

Common methods v. pRCV

Part  
4

Implementation Issues





## Part 1

# Background

- Relevant League positions
- What is proportional representation?



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine

Part  
1


# Relevant League positions

1. LWVME supports single-winner RCV.

Part  
1


# Relevant League positions

1. LWVME supports single-winner RCV.
2. LWVUS supports proportional representation.



# What is Proportional Representation?

“... the Representative Assembly, should be an exact Portrait, in Miniature, of the People at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them. . . .”  
— John Adams, 1776




See **pages 12-15** in study guide.




Part  
1

# What is Proportional Representation?

Voter Choice




Elected Body




Part  
1

# What is Proportional Representation?

Voter Choice



Elected Body



2 Republicans  
1 Democrat






Part  
1

# What is Proportional Representation?

Voter Choice



Elected Body




4 New School  
3 Low Taxes


Part  
1

# What is Proportional Representation?

Voter Choice



Elected Body




2 Females  
2 Males  
1 Female or Male



Part  
1

# This study asks...

Does LWVME support the use of  
**proportional RCV** to achieve  
**proportional representation**  
in municipal elections?



## Part 2

# What is pRCV?

- History
- Modern Usage
- Mechanics



pRCV  
STUDY




**LWV**  
of Maine

Part  
2

# What is proportional RCV (pRCV)?

- a multi-winner version of RCV

SAMPLE BALLOT

|   | 1st Choice                       | 2nd Choice                       | 3rd Choice                       |
|---|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|  Candidate One   | <input type="radio"/>            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            |
|  Candidate Two   | <input checked="" type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>            |
|  Candidate Three | <input type="radio"/>            | <input type="radio"/>            | <input checked="" type="radio"/> |

Rank only one candidate per row and one candidate per column.




See **page 12** in study guide.

Part  
2

# What is proportional RCV (pRCV)?

- a multi-winner version of RCV
- designed to produce proportional representation






See **page 16** in study guide.

Part  
2

# History of pRCV

- **pRCV was invented in Europe during the 1850**



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine




See **page 16** in study guide.

Part  
2

# History of pRCV

- pRCV was invented in Europe during the 1850
- **Common in Australia, Ireland, and Scotland**



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine





See **page 16** in study guide.

Part  
2

# History of pRCV

- pRCV was invented in Europe during the 1850
- Common in Australia, Ireland, and Scotland
- **Used in 25 cities and towns in the US, beginning in the 1920s**



[nydailynews.com](http://nydailynews.com)



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine



See **page 16** in study guide.

Part  
2

# History of pRCV

- pRCV was invented in Europe during the 1850
- Common in Australia, Ireland, and Scotland
- Used in 25 cities and towns in the US, beginning in the 1920s
- **Survived only in Cambridge, MA and Arden, DE**



Getty Images



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine



See **page 16** in study guide.

Part  
2

# History of pRCV

- pRCV was invented in Europe during the 1850
- Common in Australia, Ireland, and Scotland
- Used in 25 cities and towns in the US, beginning in the 1920s
- Survived only in Cambridge, MA and Arden, DE
  - **Recent resurgence, with 6 new implementations**



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine

# Tabulating ranked choice contests



## Single-Winner RCV (Majority)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Always 50% (+1 vote)*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

- Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Tabulation complete*
- No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

 (Repeat as needed.)



## Multi-Winner pRCV (Proportional)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Depends on the number of seats*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

- Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Surplus transfer*
- No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

 (Repeat as needed.)



See **page 22**  
in study  
guide.



pRCV  
STUDY

# Tabulating ranked choice contests



## Single-Winner RCV (Majority)

Step 1. Determine "election threshold"  
*Always 50% (+1 vote)*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Tabulation complete*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

🔄 (Repeat as needed.)



## Multi-Winner pRCV (Proportional)

Step 1. Determine "election threshold"  
*Depends on the number of seats*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Surplus transfer*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

🔄 (Repeat as needed.)



See **page 22**  
in study  
guide.




Part  
2

# Determining the election threshold

## Two-seat race?

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Election threshold} &= 1 / (\text{seats} + 1) \\ &= 1 / (2 + 1) \\ &= 1/3\end{aligned}$$



pRCV  
STUDY



See **page 23** in study guide.


**LWV**  
of Maine

Part  
2

# Determining the election threshold

## Two-seat race?

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Election threshold} &= 1 / (\text{seats} + 1) \\ &= 1 / (2 + 1) \\ &= 1/3 \text{ (+ 1 vote)}\end{aligned}$$



pRCV  
STUDY



See **page 23** in study guide.

**LWV**  
of Maine

Part  
2

# Determining the election threshold

Two seats                      Threshold =  $1/3 = 33.3\%$  (+1)

Three seats                    Threshold =  $1/4 = 25.0\%$  (+1)

Four seats                     Threshold =  $1/5 = 20.0\%$  (+1)

Five seats                     Threshold =  $1/6 = 16.7\%$  (+1)





# Tabulating ranked choice contests



## Single-Winner RCV (Majority)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Always 50% (+1 vote)*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Tabulation complete*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

🔄 (Repeat as needed.)



## Multi-Winner pRCV (Proportional)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Depends on the number of seats*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Surplus transfer*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

🔄 (Repeat as needed.)



See **page 24**  
in study  
guide.



# Tabulating ranked choice contests




## Single-Winner RCV (Majority)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Always 50% (+1 vote)*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Tabulation complete*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

 (Repeat as needed.)



## Multi-Winner pRCV (Proportional)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Depends on the number of seats*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Surplus transfer*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

 (Repeat as needed.)



See **page 24**  
in study  
guide.



pRCV  
STUDY

# Tabulating ranked choice contests



## Single-Winner RCV (Majority)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Always 50% (+1 vote)*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Tabulation complete*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

↻ (Repeat as needed.)



## Multi-Winner pRCV (Proportional)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Depends on the number of seats*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Surplus transfer*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

↻ (Repeat as needed.)



See **page 24**  
in study  
guide.



# Tabulating ranked choice contests



## Single-Winner RCV (Majority)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Always 50% (+1 vote)*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Tabulation complete*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

🔄 (Repeat as needed.)



## Multi-Winner pRCV (Proportional)

Step 1. Determine “election threshold”  
*Depends on the number of seats*

Step 2. Run-off Rounds

a. Cross threshold? → Elected  
*Surplus transfer*

b. No winner? → Eliminate lowest  
*Transfer to next choice*

🔄 (Repeat as needed.)



See **page 24**  
in study  
guide.




pRCV  
STUDY

Part  
2


# Why surplus transfer?

## Round 1




Part  
2

# Why surplus transfer?



**Two-seat race,  
so the election  
threshold is:**

$= 1/3 (+ 1 \text{ vote})$




See **page 24** in study guide.




Part  
2

# Why surplus transfer?



Part  
2


# If we skip surplus transfer...






Part  
2

# If we skip surplus transfer...




Part  
2

# Why surplus transfer?



Part  
2


# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?



Two **groups** of voters.

Part  
2


# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?



Three-seat race

Part  
2

# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?




**Three-seat race,  
so the election  
threshold is:**

$$= 1/4 (+ 1 \text{ vote})$$

Part  
2


# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?



**Election  
Threshold**

Part  
2


# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?



Election  
Threshold

Part  
2

# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?




**Election  
Threshold**




Part  
2

# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?



Part  
2


# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?



**Election  
Threshold**

Part  
2


# How does pRCV deliver proportionality?




**Election  
Threshold**

Part  
2


# And how'd we do?





Part 3

# Comparing pRCV to other election methods





See **page 28** in study guide.

Part  
3

# Comparing pRCV to common approaches

- pRCV v. Vote-for-N
- pRCV v. Single-winner, elected at large
- pRCV v. Single Member Districts



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWW**  
of Maine



See **page 28** in  
study guide.

Part  
3

# Comparing pRCV to common approaches

- pRCV v. Vote-for-N
- pRCV v. Single-winner, elected at large
- pRCV v. Single Member Districts



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWW**  
of Maine

Part  
3

# Violations of the Voting Rights Act







See **page 31** in study guide.

Part  
3


# Comparing pRCV to common approaches

- pRCV v. Vote-for-N
- pRCV v. Single-winner, elected at large
- pRCV v. Single Member Districts



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWW**  
of Maine



# Comparing pRCV to Vote-for-N



See **page 31** in  
study guide.

'N' → number of seats to be filled.

- 2 seat election? Vote for 2
- 3 seat election? Vote for 3

## School Board

*Vote for 2.*

Bob

Cindy

Donna


Elmer

Fiona

Grant


Part  
3

# Vote-for-N → Majority Capture



Part  
3

# Derry, NH → Vote-for-10




Republicans won all 10 seats with 55% of the vote.


Part  
3

# Vote-for-N is not proportional

Votes



Vote-for-N



All 10 elected  
Republican




pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine


Part  
3

# Vote-for-N is not proportional


Votes



Vote-for-N



pRCV



6 Republicans  
4 Democrats

Part  
3

# What about Nashua?




Votes

Vote-for-N

pRCV



**Derry, NH**

*One district, 10 seats*



**Nashua, NH**

*Nine districts,  
3 seats each*



Part  
3

# What about Nashua?




Votes

Vote-for-N

pRCV




**Derry, NH**

*One district, 10 seats*



**Nashua, NH**

*Nine districts,  
3 seats each*





Part  
3

# And what about voter success?




Votes

Vote-for-N

pRCV




**Derry, NH**


*One district, 10 seats*



**Nashua, NH**


*Nine districts,  
3 seats each*






# Vote-for-N can be... ... unpredictable.

- Candidate list effects



# Vote-for-N can be... ... unpredictable.

- Candidate list effects  
Too few?



# Vote-for-N can be . . . . . . unpredictable.

- Candidate list effects
  - Too few?
  - Too many?

Part  
3

# Vote-for-N can be . . . . . . unpredictable.

- Candidate list effects

Too few?

Too many?

. . . particularly in nonpartisan elections.



pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine

Part  
3

# Vote-for-N can be... ... unpredictable.

- Candidate list effects
- Vague campaigning







pRCV  
STUDY





**LWV**  
of Maine

# Pros & Cons: pRCV *vs.* Vote-for-N

## pRCV






-  Proportional results
-  High voter success
-  Minimal 'candidate list effects'
-  Promotes clear campaigning

## Vote-for-N






-  Majority capture
-  Majority voter success
-  Strong 'candidate list effects'
-  Promotes vague campaigning

# Pros & Cons: pRCV *vs.* Vote-for-N

## pRCV

-  Proportional results
-  High voter success
-  Minimal 'candidate list effects'
-  Promotes clear campaigning
-  More complex vote counting







## Vote-for-N

-  Majority capture
-  Majority voter success
-  Strong 'candidate list effects'
-  Promotes vague campaigning
-  Simple vote counting









# Pros & Cons: pRCV *vs.* Vote-for-N

## pRCV

-  Proportional results
-  High voter success
-  Minimal 'candidate list effects'
-  Promotes clear campaigning
-  More complex vote counting
-  RCV ballots

## Vote-for-N


-  Majority capture
-  Majority voter success
-  Strong 'candidate list effects'
-  Promotes vague campaigning
-  Simple vote counting
-  Plurality ballots

Part  
3


# Comparing pRCV to common approaches

- pRCV v. Vote-for-N
- pRCV v. Single-winner, elected at large
- pRCV v. Single Member Districts






# Portland's 8-seat City Council



Part  
3

# Portland's 8-seat City Council



Part  
3

# Portland's 8-seat City Council

- 5 - Single Member Districts
- 3 - Single-winner, elected at large

Part  
3

# Comparing pRCV to common approaches

- pRCV v. Vote-for-N
- pRCV v. Single-winner, elected at large
- pRCV v. Single Member Districts




pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine

Part  
3


# Single-Winner at-Large → Majority Capture




Part  
3

# Comparable at-large elections

Vote-for-N:



Single-Winner at Large:





Part  
3

# Single-Winner at-Large Staggered


Year 1



Year 2



Year 3



Part  
3

# Single-Winner at-Large Concurrent

Seat 1



Select board, Seat 1

- Erin
- Robert
- Amelia

Seat 2








Select board, Seat 2






- James

# Pros & Cons: pRCV *vs.* Single-Winner, at-large

## pRCV

-  Proportional results
-  High voter success
-  More complex vote counting
-  Consolidate elections
-  RCV ballots


## Single-winner, at-large

-  Majority capture
-  Majority voter success
-  Simple(r) vote counting
-  Overlapping terms
-  Plurality ballots

Part  
3

# Comparing pRCV to common approaches

- pRCV v. Vote-for-N
- pRCV v. Single-winner, elected at large
- pRCV v. Single Member Districts




See **page 43** in study guide.



Part  
3

# Single-Member Districts



14 Red | 6 Green

Red

17 Red | 3 Green

Red


16 Green | 4 Red

Green

Part  
3

# Single-Member Districts


Three seats to fill. Votes: 55% Purple, 45% Orange



Part  
3

# Single-Member Districts

Three seats to fill. Votes: 55% Purple, 45% Orange



12 Purple | 8 Orange

Purple

12 Purple | 8 Orange

Purple


11 Orange | 9 Purple

Orange

Part  
3

# Problem #1: Redistricting

Three seats to fill. Votes: 55% Purple, 45% Orange



15 Purple | 5 Orange

Purple

11 Orange | 9 Purple

Orange

11 Orange | 9 Purple


Orange



Part  
3

# Problem #1: Redistricting

Three seats to fill. Votes: 55% Purple, 45% Orange



11 Purple | 9 Orange

Purple

11 Purple | 9 Orange


Purple

11 Orange | 9 Purple

Purple

Part  
3


# pRCV delivers proportionality...



**Election  
Threshold**

Part  
3

# pRCV delivers proportionality...



Part  
3

*Problem #2:*  
**Voting blocs  
may not be  
stable.**



pRCV  
STUDY

Part  
3

*Problem #2:*  
**Voting blocs  
may not be  
stable.**



pRCV  
STUDY

Part  
3

## *Problem #3:* Demographic changes




pRCV  
STUDY



Part  
3


# Problem #4: Demographic distribution



Three seats to fill. Votes: 55% Purple, 45% Orange

Part  
3

# Limited voter success...



12 Purple | 8 Orange

Purple

12 Purple | 8 Orange

Purple


11 Orange | 9 Purple

Orange



Part  
3

# Voter Success vs. Competitive Elections



Part  
3

# Other Considerations:

- Geographic Diversity?

Part  
3

# Other Considerations:

- Geographic Diversity?
- Constituent Relations?

Part  
3

# Other Considerations:

- Geographic Diversity?
- Constituent Relations?

*Single-member districts are smaller.*

# Other Considerations:

- Geographic Diversity?
- Constituent Relations?

*Single-member districts are smaller.  
pRCV representative shares views.*

Part  
3

# Other Considerations:

- Geographic Diversity?
- Constituent Relations?
- Candidates and Campaigning?

Part  
3

# Pros & Cons: pRCV *vs.* Single-Winner Districts

## pRCV






- 👍 Proportional results
- 👍 Limited (or no) redistricting
- 👍 High rates of voter success  
*and* more competitive races

## Single-Winner Districts






- 👎 It depends...
- 👎 Requires deliberate districting
- 👎 Can't have both high voter success *and* competitiveness

# Pros & Cons: pRCV *vs.* Single-Winner Districts

## pRCV

-  Proportional results
-  Limited (or no) redistricting
-  High rates of voter success  
*and* more competitive races
-  Possible geographic diversity
-  More complex vote counting









## Single-Winner Districts

-  *It depends...*
-  Requires deliberate districting
-  Can't have both high voter  
success *and* competitiveness
-  Certain geographic diversity
-  Simple vote counting











# Pros & Cons: pRCV *vs.* Single-Winner Districts

## pRCV

-  Proportional results
-  Limited (or no) redistricting
-  High rates of voter success  
*and* more competitive races
-  Possible geographic diversity
-  More complex vote counting
-  Constituent relations?
-  Campaigning?
-  RCV ballots

## Single-Winner Districts

-  *It depends...*
-  Requires deliberate districting
-  Can't have both high voter success  
*and* competitiveness
-  Certain geographic diversity
-  Simple(r) vote counting
-  Constituent relations?
-  Campaigning?
-  Plurality ballots

Part 4

# Implementation Issues




pRCV  
STUDY

**LWV**  
of Maine

Part  
4

# Implementation

- Eligibility - All Maine municipalities.




See **page 53** in study guide.



Part  
4

# Implementation

- Eligibility - All Maine municipalities.
- Voter Education




See **page 53** in study guide.



Part  
4

# Implementation

- Eligibility - All Maine municipalities.
- Voter Education
- Cost - Comparable to single-winner RCV



See **page 53** in study guide.



# Summary

- **Proportional representation is a fundamental democratic value**
- **LWVUS supports proportional representation**
- **Common election methods are not reliably proportional**
- **pRCV is an established proportional election method**
- **Implementation costs are comparable to single-winner RCV**



pRCV  
STUDY

